



**“EXILÉS DE L'INTÉRIEUR”: RHETORIC OF INDIGNATION AND
NOSTALGIA IN FRENCH FAR-RIGHT POPULIST DISCOURSE**

Alina Mozolevska*

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* Associate Professor, Petro Mohyla Black Sea National University, Mykolaiv, Ukraine

Institute of European Studies and International Relations

Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences

Comenius University Bratislava

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Abstract

This paper focuses on far-right populist French discourse to explore how longing for the past and emotions reshape the construction of political communication. It analyses the discourses of Eric Zemmour and the program of his party Reconquête during French presidential campaign 2022. Using Critical Discourse Analysis approach to the corpus, the paper aims to understand what political narratives and discursive strategies are being used by Zemmour to construct the image of the French people “exiled from inside” and feed their feelings of dispossession and indignation.

Key words: discourse analysis, populism, nostalgia, discursive strategy, French political discourse, far-right politics

Introduction

In recent years, Europe has witnessed an increase in populist and nationalist movements driven by global challenges such as globalization, migration crises, and growing distrust in established political systems (Algan et al, 2017; Cox, 2017; Hartleb, 2018). The proliferation of these discourses that constantly reshape political landscape is characterized by glorification of the national narratives, demonization of the other and increasing feeling of nostalgia. Eduardo Campanella and Marta Dassù argue that nowadays “nostalgia becomes an emotional weapon in the political debate” (Campanella, Dassù (2), 2019, 2). By weaponizing the glorious past, politicians reject a “cosmopolitan world and yearn for the socio-economic opportunities enjoyed by older generations” and, in this case, nationalism can be seen as a fertile “source of identity and security” for many people (Campanella, Dassù (2), 2019, 2). Indeed, in many countries, the longing for the glorious past is one of the key elements of the geopolitical vision of the present and the future of the nation-state, as it represents a fundamental aspect of national self-representation. It is not surprising that, gradually, nostalgia has become a successful strategy of political campaigning. In Russia, for many years, people are being mobilized by the post-Soviet nostalgia and the imperial myth of the great Russia. In the USA, Donald Trump came into power promising to make America great again and to preserve America for Americans by constructing the great wall to minimize migration. The Brexit campaign was focused on “taking back control” over politics and power, restoring the greatness of the state and its sovereignty and protecting the country from unwelcomed foreigners. The French political landscape is not an exception. The glorious past of the country is at the heart of the campaigning of right-wing parties in today’s presidential elections, and the candidates are extensively using the iconic images of French history and civilization in promotional videos and debates, contrasting them with France’s present. Some even go further, demanding to save the country of their ancestors (Laurence, 2021). As Elisabeth Zerofsky argues: “In France, political identities tend to coalesce around views of the past” (Zerofsky, 2022).

These examples show that most of nostalgic narratives tend to promise to rediscover “the good old days” of a nation, providing one of the most obvious and powerful tools for politicians and their parties (Flinders, 2018). Traditionally, nostalgic rhetoric is related to right-wing politics, representing the longing for the past of those, “who were left behind” by globalization, migration processes, and rapid socio-economic changes in modern nation-states (Kenny, 2017). But this longing for “a golden age of heroic virtue, moral coherence, and ethical certainty, a period in which there was no gap between virtue and action” (Stauth, Turner, 1988, 47) is also productive for the exploration of the relation between the imperial past of the states and their aspirations for the future (Kalinina, 2014; Karakaya, 2020). Thus, nowadays nostalgia is more often understood not as single occurrence but more as “a historical emotion” or “a symptom of our age” resulting from “new understanding of time and space that makes the division into local and universal possible” provoking the desire “to turn history into ... collective mythology” (Boym, 2007).

In this paper, we would like to explore how nostalgia is weaponized in the populist discourse of a far-right candidate for the presidential elections 2022, Eric Zemmour, a political journalist, essayist, and writer, who announced his candidacy for the presidential race on the 30th of November 2021. We pay special attention to the role of emotions and performative practices in the mobilization of voters by Zemmour and his newly formed party, Reconquête (formed on December 5, 2021). Some scholarly works have already explored the relationships between nostalgia, emotions, and political discourse. Recent case studies have shown how nostalgia works in different national political contexts and how nationalist revivals all over the world are related to the politics of belonging and weaponization of nostalgia. So far, the literature on nostalgia has covered the relation between post-Soviet nostalgia and politics (Kalinina, 2014; Lavinia 2019; Koziura, 2019), nostalgia and ideology (Kenny, 2017), nostalgia and coloniality (Bissell, 2005), memory politics and nostalgia (Bouma, 2019), political staging and nostalgia (Karakaya 2, 2020), and analyzed the strategies of the politics of

nostalgia (Stuart 1995; Smith, Campbell, 2017). A considerable amount of scholarly work also reflects an interest in the role of nostalgia in the development of right-wing populism in USA and Europe (Mudde, 2017; Lammers, Baldwin, 2020; Norocel, Hellström, Bak Jørgensen, 2020; Ezgi, 2021). There exists a number of studies which focus on the analysis of French right-wing populism (Rydgren, 2008; Scrinzi, 2017; Snipes and Mudde, 2020; Stockemer and Barisione, 2017; Williams, 2011), however, there are no studies about instrumentalization of nostalgic rhetoric by right-wing parties in French presidential elections of 2022. Thus, this study makes further contributions to the literature on the weaponization of collective nostalgia in political discourse by revealing how nostalgic rhetoric is remediated in French political discourse. The aim of this paper is to understand how nostalgic narratives are used as a mechanism of power in right-wing populist discourse and in what way they serve to recontextualize the national identity and historical context within the opposition ‘us vs other’. By analyzing the discursive practices of Eric Zemmour and his Reconquête party, the aim is to find out how these discourses employ emotions to shape main political narratives and challenge established political system in France.

Theoretical framework

The paper provides the analysis of 6 interviews of Eric Zemmour delivered between 25.11.2021 and 10.04.2022. The electoral program of Recoquête and its promotional videos are also included in the dataset. The study uses the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1992, 1995; Wodak, 2009) with a special focus on the discursive approach to populism inspired by the works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau, Muffe, 1985; Laclau, 2005) that allows to analyze how power relations are being verbalized in discursive, social, and performative practices. Within the framework of this research, the populism is understood as thin-centered ideology that considers society to be separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the elite’

(Mudde, 2004, 562). We believe, following Laclau, that these two types of collective identities are negotiable and discursively constructed by articulation of equivalence and difference by varied social actors because society itself is a construction that does not come from any predefined basis (Laclau, 2005, 83). In political communication, the presence of other is crucial for self-identification and establishment of collective identities. Laclau sees the construction of an antagonistic frontier between the other and the “people” as one of the preconditions of development of populism, which together with the equivalential articulation of popular demands makes the emergence of the “people” possible (Laclau, 2005, 74). Thus, while studying populist discourse, we need to pay particular attention to the means of discursive construction of above-mentioned social identities. This paper provides an analysis of verbalization of core concepts of populism (the “people”, the elite, the other) in Zemmour’s discourse combining it with examination of historical narratives, nostalgia and emotional dynamics of political communication as fundamental components of right-wing populist rhetoric (Nguyen et al, 2022; Wodak, 2015).

The leader and the “people” in Zemmour’s discourse

Eric Zemmour, “populist ‘French Trump’” (Cendrowicz, 2021), is a well-known, ultra-nationalist journalist and TV personality, author of more than ten books and numerous articles, who entered the political stage in November 2021. Until this time, he was not directly involved in politics and did not belong to any political party. Zemmour was considered as one of the possible future candidates of right-wing French political power since 2019 (Franceinter, 2019) and he quickly became a potentially competitive candidate, obtaining 16,5 % in the polls and occupying the second position in the presidential race, just behind Emmanuel Macron (Ifop-Fiducial, 18.02.2022). With the development of the electoral campaign, his popularity slightly fell (till 13%), but nevertheless, he could obtain the 4th position in the first round of the presidential election 2022, which proves a significant support of his ideas by French voters. During his presidential

campaign, Zemmour advocated for serious changes in the political and social system of the country, promoting the ideas of white supremacy. Key points of his program were inspired by the replacement theory of Renaud Camus. Let us analyze what narratives and emotional patterns have been used to promote his main ideas and to construct the antagonism between the “people” and the other.

Since the very beginning of the presidential campaign, Zemmour has positioned himself as the messianic candidate (Mager, 2022), the savior of the nation whose main objectives are not only to protect traditional values, French culture, and history, but also to reconquer the identity, sovereignty, excellence, and prosperity of the French people (Electoral program, 2022). His messianic role in the destiny of the country is realized through the narrative of the savior, an image of a strong leader, father of the nation, present in his program and analyzed interviews: “I decided to be a candidate for the presidency of the French Republic, so that France remains France. I can't see the most beautiful country in the world disappear before our very eyes¹” (Declaration of Zemmour, 2021). He declares that his duty is to save “his people”, “a great people”, who deserve to remain great and have its place in history (Electoral program, 2022). Zemmour portrays himself as a strong leader and constantly underlines the extraordinariness of his leadership, insisting that he is the only person capable of saving the country: “I am convinced that I am the only one capable of stemming our downgrading and preventing our replacement ” (Declaration of Zemmour, 2021). According to his own words, he expresses the will and the grievance of the people who are disappointed in the politics of the previous leaders, who have not been able to implement the necessary changes to save the country:

This candidacy imposed itself on me when I understood that what I had been defending for so many years would never be supported by politicians and that the peaceful France that I had known would soon no longer exist if we did not act... No doubt, like you, I am tired of promises and betrayals (Declaration of Zemmour, 2021).

¹ translation from French is ours

Zemmour's political "we" is verbalized through a set of nominations such as "France, country, Frenchmen, people, French people, homeland, nation, us". He often uses the pronoun "we" referring to the French nation to demonstrate his union with the people. Zemmour consolidates this collective actor, "his people", by confronting it with the common enemy, the ruling elite, which Zemmour considers to be directly responsible for economic and social problems in the country:

It [France] has suffered so much and has been neglected so much by our successive leaders, that in all domains, it will be necessary to repair the innumerable mistakes that have been made over the past 40 years. Economy, ecology, purchasing power, public services, immigration, insecurity: none of the major components of the action that we must carry out escapes the serious and complete project that we are beginning today to present to the French people (05.12.2021)

In Zemmour's discourse, the antagonistic relationships are built between the "system" and the simple citizens, who are unsatisfied with the politics of the state. The "system" is represented not only by the power institutions, the president, the government, the judges, but also by mainstream media. Zemmour confronts the existing regime claiming that the ruling elite decides the destiny of the whole country without taking into consideration the people's voice: "The power had decided it, the journalists had wanted it, the right had accepted it: the next presidential election was to be a formality for five more years of macronism" (05.12.2021). He accuses the ruling elite in putting in danger the national interests, by complying with the politics of EU and leading the politics of open borders, by prioritizing economic interest over social needs of people, by underestimating the importance of French national heritage and uniqueness, which leads to the destruction of "his people" and of the "best country in the world":

Macron has emptied our economy, our identity, our culture, our freedom, our energy, our hopes, our lives. He has emptied everything, because he alone is the great void, the abyss. In 2017, France elected the abyss and fell into it. My friends, it is time. It is time to get our country and our people out of this bottomless pit. (05.12.2022)

The group of us is portrayed as direct victims of “the system”, as those, who are deeply traumatized and endangered by this deliberate drastic transformation of the country. According to him, people need to unite with their leader in order to “defend our country, our homeland, the heritage of our ancestors and the one that we will entrust to our children” (05.12.2021). Zemmour also uses fear as the main mobilizer against “the system” depicting it as a direct threat to the existence of the nation and claiming that French nation is dying but is afraid to die and resists (18.03.2022). He argues that people are not heard by the authorities, and only Zemmour is able to listen to them: “I immersed myself in France with people, who told me about their lives, their anxieties, their hopes... Really, I met these French people, who don't want to die, who don't want to be replaced” (8.04.2022). And the politician is convinced that only he, as the true leader, can give them voice and bring the necessary change to “save our people”. In addition, in his electoral program, he affirms that these elections are totally different from the previous ones because now the destiny of the nation is at stake and, in this way, underlines the exceptionality of his candidacy: “France is at the crossroads of its own history: economically, culturally, demographically, our country could gradually fade from the great march of the world” (Electoral program, 2022). Zemmour constantly challenges the hegemonic order by calling for substitution of ruling elite and giving the power to people by creating “a government of people by the people and for the people” (30.11.2021). According to him, only his leadership and the rule of people can save the country and allow it become “once again a beacon that lights up the world and that our people are once again admired, envied and respected (05.12.2021)”.

Thus, Zemmour discursively constructs an antagonistic frontier between the group of us, the “people”, and the ruling elite, the enemy, by aggravating the popular discontent and claiming that the power institutions pose a danger for the nation. The exceptionality of his leadership is verbalized through the claim that only Zemmour hears the voice of the people and can satisfy its demands. He

intensifies this opposition by mobilizing voters, using several political narratives and appealing to emotions, which will be analyzed further.

Emotions and historical narratives in Zemmour's discourse

Zemmour's main narratives are built around alternative romanticized history, melancholic reminiscences about "the golden times" of France, and aggressive mobilization against the group of others. Except for the construction of the narrative of the savior, he focuses on the conceptualization of the narrative of the "golden age", on the construction of the group of others, and propagates a narrative of crisis. His campaigning is aimed at the homogeneous group of us, the French people, who need to fight in order to not disappear and do everything to make France remain France. Based on the idea of 'traditional values' and nativist ideology, Zemmour constructs his exclusionary discourse by articulating a pallet of emotional responses at the same time, from melancholy, pride, hope to fear, anger, and despair. These emotional frames are discursively linked to his main narratives (narrative of the savior, narrative of crisis, narrative of the "golden age") and serve as the primary means of popular mobilization of the group of us. With the help of positive emotions such as pride and hope, and melancholic longing for the legendary French past, he attempts to unite voters, who share the same emotional connection with the country. From the other hand, he is constantly generating the fear of apocalyptic future, of the danger of extinction of the whole nation in the face of the threat coming from "other people and other civilization" (28.03.2022), which provokes the anger and hate towards the other, and the feeling of resentment aimed at the reconquest of the past, an ideal of national homogeneity. Another source of the anger are those, who condemned French people for vanishing and betrayed the whole nation by letting France "to continue to quietly leave History and the French ... to disappear in silence on the land of their ancestors" (05.12.2021) – the ruling elite. Positive emotions are connected to the common past that needs to be reconquered in the fight against the common enemy:

Yes, the Reconquest is here! The reconquest of our economy, the reconquest of our security, the reconquest of our identity, the reconquest of our sovereignty, the reconquest of our country! ...We are going to reconquer our country to turn it back again! (05.11.2021)

Zemmour instrumentalizes the shared collective emotions and political narratives from the very first days of his campaigning. On November 30, 2022 he announces his candidacy, addressing his audience through an eight-minute video posted on YouTube. There, he presents the core ideas of his presidential program and introduces an emotional concept of “exilés de l’intérieur” (“exiled from inside”, inspired by the theory of replacement), which symbolically describes French nation who is about to lose its territory and identity. This concept combines the melancholic longing, the feeling of loss and hopelessness, and allows him to develop several political narratives: to construction the group of us, the group of others, and develop the narrative of crisis (Moffit, 2015). Throughout his campaigning, Zemmour claims that the French people are losing their own country without physically leaving it:

You haven't moved and yet you feel like you're no longer at home. You have not left your country but it is as if your country has left you. You feel like foreigners in your own country, you are exiles from within (30.11.2021).

By saying that the French people do not belong to their country anymore, that they feel themselves foreigners, Zemmour tries to mobilize the sense of loss and individual emotional longing for the past and to rescale it to the dimension of the whole country. This “strange and penetrating feeling” of internal exile is tightly connected with the feeling of longing for the collective past, where Zemmour entangles the individual nostalgic memories with the glorious historical events and famous personalities of the country:

You feel like you are no longer in the country you know. You remember the country you knew as a child, you remember the country your parents described to you. You remember the country... of Joan of Arc, Bonaparte and General de Gaulle, the country of the knights... the country of Victor Hugo... (31.11.2021).

Using sentimental memories about the country of the childhood and saying that “this country, which you cherish is disappearing ”, allows to Zemmour to romanticize the image of France and to construct an imagined world close and familiar to many voters. By appealing to French historical figures and drawing idealistic pictures of the past, he attempts to mobilize the feeling of resentment based on the lost exceptionality of the French culture at the globalization age. The politician claims that France did not say its last word and will fight to reconquest its lost glory: “These French people, who have been there for 1000 years and who want to remain masters at home for another 1000 years, have not said their last word” (05.12.2021). The very name of his party, Reconquête, consolidates the feeling of resentment of the voters implicating the reconquest of the lost national glory. In his electoral program, Zemmour advocates for the necessity to reconquer and save for the future generations “a France as prosperous, united and peaceful as the one we inherited ” (Electoral program, 2022). The resentment is closely connected to the leadership of the French state in political, cultural, and economic spheres that, according to Zemmour, was lost in the 80ties or 90ties. For Zemmour, the true France is a country of the past, the country that only exists in the films or in the books (31.11.2021), placed somewhere in the seventies, a prosperous state with strong borders and homogenous population, an ideal that is almost lost. It the period dominated by patriarchal order, law and social harmony. Zemmour’s France is based on the feeling of the affection to the local, to the past, to the “good old times” and the rejection of the present, of the global, of the progress. The former times, for him, are a period of “a great cultural coherence of the French people” (25.11.2022), a time of national homogeneity and glory of French civilization and culture, while the present is associated with the “decline of France” provoked by the ruling elite. The old France belongs to the collective “we” constructed by the politician, to the authentic Frenchmen, people who share the same religion, the same vision of the past and present and consider themselves as a part of one glorious nation. Later in his campaigning, Zemmour repeatedly addresses to the “glorious” past of the country and to the necessity to protect “the

French genius against the standardizing phenomenon of globalization”, which serves as a strong mobilizer of positive, melancholic emotions and the feeling of resentment at the same time. Thus, Zemmour constructs strong emotional attachment to the past, constantly appealing to the significant historical events and figures throughout his campaigning and opposes it to the apocalyptic vision of the present linked to the failures caused by the ruling elite.

It is worth mentioning that Zemmour’s personal memories also play a remarkable role in the construction of the idealistic image of the past. In his official declaration for the presidential campaign, Zemmour says:

I am the child of a modest, but loving and always dignified family. I was born in the suburbs of Paris, in Montreuil, and I grew up in Drancy... My parents, Jews from Algeria, had experienced their arrival in France as an extraordinary opportunity, they transmitted to me the love of this country. They taught me to respect, cherish and defend our country. I have unfortunately seen France change... I have seen disorder arise, delinquency take hold, identity fade away (Declaration of Zemmour, 2021).

He describes his childhood and youth as not only best years in his life but also as the period of the flourishing of the French society. Zemmour is proud of his multi-ethnic origins and especially of the fact that he succeeded in becoming the true French person: “You can change civilization. Me, I was born, my ancestors were born in an Arab-Muslim civilization and we came here. We came to France. We came to French civilization,... and we assimilated to French civilization” (28.03.2022). He claims that he owes his professional success to the French education and civilization, because only in France he could realize his potential: “Me, I am a product of French colonization and ... I bless French colonization ... I say thank you to the French colonizer because he brought us French culture” (25.11.2021). By telling his life story, revealing details of his biography, building the contrast between the past and the present, Zemmour gradually builds out the elements of the image of the authentic Frenchman. This Frenchness, according to Zemmour, can be measured by the degree of assimilation into the French civilization, by one’s love for the country and by the

respect of its customs and traditions. Moreover, Zemmour uses his life experience to assert the importance of values proper to “white heterosexual man” and to propagate fear of globalization, unification, islamization of the country etc. By mirroring the life experiences of an average person and verbalizing his or her fears of the unknown and new, he succeeded in constructing an emotional bond between the leader and the voters. The experience of personal witnessing of the transformation of the country (“You know I’m quite old I knew in the 70s and 80s until the 90s, there were social benefits reserved for the French ...then there has been a changeover, we did not voluntarily make no more distinction between nationals and foreigners” (28 03.2022)), also creates the sense of solidarity with his voters, depicting Zemmour as a victim of the changes in the country. Thus, while constructing the image of France and generating nostalgic longing for the past, Zemmour mixes collective and individual emotions and memories, which has a greater mobilization effect on the audience.

The conceptualization of the other in Zemmour’s discourse.

Zemmour reinforces the feeling of dispossession and loss, introducing the opposition between the group of us and the group of them. The image of the other is very important for the visualization of the group of us and the representation of France’s present. Zemmour consistently constructs the opposition between different parts of French society, dividing it into two categories – authentic Frenchmen and others (“foreigners, migrants, Muslims”) – who, according to Zemmour, are in a state of constant confrontation. Zemmour’s other is omnipresent, dangerous, and criminalized, if this group prevails, it would mean the end of French civilization. He argues that the country is already invaded by marginalized foreigners, who do not respect French way of life and bring their own traditions and customs into the country:

You go out in the street, you go anywhere, you go to the suburbs of Paris and you see cities where we are no longer in France, that is to say, where burqas

and veils have replaced dresses and skirts, where kebabs have replaced bistros, where halal butchers have replaced French butchers (28.03.2022).

According to Zemmour, French people are threatened by this hostile heterogeneous group of others from outside and inside. This goes in line with what Laclau notes, as the identification of the “other” plays a significant role in the negative constitution of the “people”. Inside the country, the other represents a source of disorder, violence, crime, and economic instability. During his campaigning he repeatedly says that the foreigners, who are gradually replacing French people, are responsible for the degradation of the social and economic pillars of the society:

The French have been driven out by foreigners and immigrants because in these suburbs of the metropolis. We no longer live in the French way, they have become foreign enclaves, enclaves most often Islamized where we walk around in hijab, in djellab, where there are only kebabs and where there are only halal butchers (8.04.2022).

The other is a direct threat to the way of life “à la française”, to everything that is dear to many French and is presented in Zemmour’s discourse as the fight for the survival of the nation.

The other is also associated with the threat from outside and depicted as a planned movement of mass migration, which is often associated with the war in Zemmour’s discourse: “Immigration is war. They want to invade our European countries, that's all, it's not another thing, it's a war” (25.11.2021). According to him, this “migrant invasion” is able to dissolve France in Europe and Africa or even make it disappear: “...Macron wants to dissolve France in Europe and in Africa. Me, I don't want to dissolve France either in Europe or in Africa” (30.11.2021). This militarist, aggressive discourse constructs a wall between the group of us and the group of others. Moreover, Zemmour denounces the destructive role of the ruling elite in the migration crisis, saying that its “uniformizer politics” and “globalizing ideology” lead to the extermination of the nation. Using such conspiratorial discourse, the politician mobilizes the

populiation, addressing their fear of the other and successfully constructing the narrative of crisis based exclusively on the migration issue:

I think that the biggest crisis that is coming is the migration crisis and the demographic crisis in France which sees the French people being replaced by another people and by another civilization for me it is the most serious crisis that threatens us, the French (28.03.2022).

He sees migration as the main source of the state of “internal exile” of the French people and compares it with the “Trojan horse”, which stealthily spreads alien culture and religion within the country that provokes the sense of loss and disorientation among French people. The migration crisis is perceived as the leading factor of islamization of the country and radicalization of certain ethnic groups. Zemmour claims that his aggressive discourse aimed at the generation of fear and hate reflects the general moods of the society: “Ask the French if Islam is dangerous for the French republic and there are too many immigrants or if the great replacement threatens us, there are between 60 and 70% of the French who agree with me” (28.03.2022). According to him, more than 60% of French population supports his ideas, but some just do not dare talk about these issues. He considers Islam as a main source of terror and extremism, and proclaims himself as the only person, who is able to put an end to this phenomenon by the implementation of the politics of change: “I will put an end to the Islamization of our country” (Electoral program, 2022).

Conclusion

As we could see in his discourse, Zemmour consistently propagates populist rhetoric constructing an antagonistic frontier between different parts of the society, dividing it into us and them. He constructs the “people”, employing nativist ideas of the nation and France for French, and opposes it to the ruling elite, the enemy, and the other, foreigners and migrants. The other is perceived as force, that threatens the homogeneity of French people and is capable of destroying not only the French identity, but also religion, history, culture and sovereignty of the nation-state. Affective discourse and historical narratives play

a significant role in the construction of the key elements of his campaigning. Disseminating right-wing ideology, he consolidates conspiracy and hate discourse around the image of the other and France's present, and advocates for national homogeneity and for the return to the lost prosperity through the exclusion of the other. The politician uses the concept of "exiled from inside" to link negative emotions to the present of the country, which is associated with degradation, disorder, the loss of glory, territory, identity, and sovereignty. By weaponizing collective nostalgia, he constructs an alternative vision of the past of the nation as a period of excellence and prosperity, and connects the present with the feeling of internal exile and despair. By describing France's present as "decline of France", he successfully verbalizes the narrative of the savior, which is aimed at the explanation of the exceptionality of his leadership and the role in the reconstruction of the historical justice for the French people.

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